A characterisation of system-wide propagation in the malware landscape by Korczynski, David
A characterisation of system-wide propagation in the malware
landscape
David Korczynski
david.korczynski@cs.ox.ac.uk
Department of Computer Science
University of Oxford
ABSTRACT
System-wide propagation is frequently observed in malware, and
there are several resources, like blog posts and similar, that detail
some of the techniques used. However, there is currently no thor-
ough study on the subject at large, and the full extent of system-wide
malware propagation remains unknown. In this paper, we perform
a systematic study on many real-world samples to comprehensively
characterise system-wide propagation within the malware land-
scape and the goal is to use detailed and precise analyses to derive
high-level views. We achieve this by collecting a diverse set of
malware samples, analyse them in our Minerva malware analysis
framework and then extract vast amounts of statistics about the
results. We use these results to provide an in-depth discussion
centred on four main research questions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e number of malware samples we discover continues to grow
year by year and the ability to automatically analyse these threats
is a critical part of our defense. e underpinnings of malware
analysis can broadly be categorised in the two broad categories of
static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis analyses the malware
without executing it and dynamic analysis relies on executing the
given sample. Dynamic analysis is typically performed by way of a
malware sandbox, i.e. by executing the sample in an isolated and
dedicated environment usually based on some form of virtualisation.
e popularity of malware sandboxes have grown signicantly
in the last decade [1, 6, 14, 17, 25, 29, 35] and they are aractive
because they allow precise analysis of concrete malware executions,
which can be used to circumvent various obfuscation and packing
techniques that are typically deployed by the malware.
However, malware oen comes with several capabilities in order
to avoid dynamic analysis and in recent years the concept of eva-
sive malware has been a popular technique for malware authors.
One particular technique adopted by malware is the concept of
system-wide malware execution. is refers to malware executing
throughout the entire system by way of multi-process propagation,
code injection, code-reuse aacks and alike. In essence, this form of
execution paradigm complicates the task of precisely capturing the
malware execution since the malware may execute in stealthy ways,
e.g. within the execution-context of otherwise benign processes.
e academic community has responded and made several eorts
into studying the problem [2–4, 20, 22, 25].
Although system-wide malware propagation has received aen-
tion from the academic community, there are currently no com-
prehensive studies on the subject and the scope of the problem at
large remains unknown. Most resources are anecdotal examples of
code injection techniques [16, 27] and blog posts by anti-malware
researchers [7, 18], and these mainly present results based on man-
ual analysis of specic samples. is is an important missing gap
of knowledge since systematic studies of large malware data sets
are essential for anti-malware research. We rely on these studies
to systematise our knowledge, design new experiments that verify
our techniques and to explore new research avenues.
In this paper, we aim to ll this gap by performing the rst
large-scale systematic study of system-wide malware propagation.
To this end, we build a comprehensive statistics component into
the Minerva malware analysis sandbox presented [24] and then
use our framework to analyse and characterise a large and diverse
set of malware samples. Our study is focused on three aspects of
system-wide propagation. First, to understand the prevalence and
diversity of system-wide malware propagation. Second, to under-
stand the relationship between system-wide malware propagation
and malicious activities. ird, to understand system-wide malware
propagation evolution over time and inter-family characteristics of
malware propagation strategy.
To reason about system-wide malware executions at large, we
dene the concept of a system-wide control-ow graph, which is
a data structure that describes the entire system-wide malware
execution. Eectively, this data structure combines the ability to
identify multi-process execution [25] and capture execution waves
[24] to give a complete overview of a given malware propagation.
We perform our study with a comprehensive set of malware
samples that reects a diverse and broad view of malware in the
wild. e data set we collect has samples from many dierent
families, many dierent malware types and samples that were
discovered over a seven-year time-frame. In addition to this, our
data set is completely balanced in terms of samples per family so
as to avoid biases in the results.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose the concept of a system-wide control ow
graph which captures intrinsic aspects of malware propa-
gation in a given sample.
• We collect a data set with a broad range of malware samples
that were discovered across the last seven years.
• We implement a comprehensive and rigorous statistics
component that interprets the results of Minerva.
• We characterise system-wide malware propagation through
a detailed and thorough study of the malware samples by
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analysing them in Minerva and gathering many dierent
and insightful statistics.
2 MINERVA BACKGROUND
e work we present in this paper uses our malware analysis system
Minerva described in earlier work [24]. In order to make this
paper self-contained we will briey cover in this section the core
techniques that Minerva uses to analyse malware which are relevant
for this paper.
Minerva traces the malware execution based on dynamic taint
analysis so as to capture the malware execution throughout the
entire system and the specic purpose is to monitor malware execu-
tion in the context of multi-process propagation. In short, Minerva
taints the malware when it is loaded into memory, including both
code and data sections of the malware module, and then considers
malware execution to be each instruction executed on the system
that is made up of tainted memory. Furthermore, the output of
each tainted instruction is also tainted, so as to capture dynamically
generated code by the malware. In this way, Minerva captures mal-
ware execution without any hooks on common APIs for process
propagation, e.g. CreateRemoteThread. is specic approachin
Minerva was adopted from Tartarus [25].
In addition to capturing system-wide malware execution, Min-
erva also captures dynamically generated code by the malware
using an information-ow model. is is used for automatic un-
packing and capturing of shellcode, and the key idea behind the
information-ow approach is to capture dynamically generated
code independently of who wrote the code. Specically, it is oen
the case that malware will force benign code to create dynamically
generated code on its behalf, and the information-ow model will
capture this, contrary to the models of dynamically generated code
used in many traditional unpackers that only capture dynamically
generated code explicitly by the malware [9, 12, 21, 23]. In this pa-
per, we call each wave of dynamically generated code an “execution
wave”.
Minerva is built on top of the QEMU [8] full-system emulator and,
more specically, Minerva relies on the PANDA [13] framework. In
this paper we have made minimal additions to Minerva, however,
we have built a large statistics-framework around the system that
allows us to use the precise malware analysis oered by Minerva
to extract large amounts of data.
3 SYSTEM-WIDE PROPAGATION GRAPH
In this section, we introduce the concept of a system-wide propaga-
tion graph (SPG). Intuitively, SPG combines the output of Minerva
into one single data structure. is data structure, thus, captures
intrinsic aspects of host-based malware propagation in terms of
multi-process execution and dynamically generated code. Infor-
mally, the SPG is a directed graph where the nodes constitute execu-
tion waves, and the edges constitute transitions from one execution
wave to another. Each node then contains meta information to
capture useful properties, such as their particular process. Formally,
the SPG is described as follows.
Denition 1. A system-wide propagation graph is a 3-tuple, SPG=(V,
E, vˆ), where G=(V, E) is a directed weakly-connected graph such that
each node is an execution wave, each edge is a control-ow transition,
and vˆ ∈ V is the entry point.
To capture the SPG in practice, we must be able to identify all of
the execution waves and the corresponding control-ow transitions
for a given malware sample. Minerva already supports capturing
execution waves and identifying control-ow transitions between
execution waves across processes (adopted from Tartarus [25]),
however, to capture control-ow transitions from waves internally
within a process, we make an edge from the last instruction exe-
cuted before the entry of a new execution wave.
To reason quantitatively about malware propagation we build
several denitions on the SPG and the general idea is to describe
malware propagation techniques in more ways than only counting
the number of processes and the number of waves. We give insights
about the malware propagation topology by creating two denitions
that capture the maximum depth of processes and waves and one
denition that describes the width of the SPG.
Denition 2. Given an SPG, G=(V, E, vˆ), the process-depth of PD(G)
is the maximum number of dierent processes visited amongst all
non-cyclic path through G, starting from vˆ .
Denition 3. Given an SPG, G=(V, E, vˆ), the wave-depth WD(G) is
the size of the longest non-cyclic path through G, starting from vˆ .
Denition 4. Given an SPG, G=(V, E, vˆ), the SPG-width |G | is the
maximum number of non-cyclic paths from the entry-point vˆ to all
of the leaf nodes in the graph.
Notice that Denition 2 and Denition 3 are dierent from cal-
culating the total number of processes and waves, respectively. e
notion of depth in the malware execution is relevant because it en-
capsulates how deep into the malware execution a manual malware
analyst must go before reaching the end of an injection/unpacking
sequence, for example, in a debugger. e notion of SPG-width
given in Denition 4 aims to capture how broadly malware exe-
cutes on a system, and, therefore, describes the number of execution
paths in the malware propagation rather than how deep they are.
3.1 Example of system-wide propagation graph
To illustrate system-wide propagation graphs, as well as process-
depth, wave-depth and SPG-width, we show the SPG of a malware
sample from the Tinba family in Figure 1. e sample initially cre-
ates one wave of dynamically generated code in its initial process
and then launches a new process of the otherwise benign Win-
dows application winver.exe. e malware injects code into the
launched winver.exe process and the code in winver.exe further
creates another wave of dynamically generated code. e second
wave in winver.exe injects code into the otherwise benign Win-
dows process explorer.exe and inside this process, the malware
proceeds to inject code into ve other processes on the system. e
process-depth of the SPG is four, the wave-depth is six, and the
SPG-width is ve.
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We now elaborate on the methodology for our large-scale empirical
study. Specically, we outline our data set, our research questions
and also describe our experimental setup, including false-positive
removal.
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{P2W0, P5W0}, {P2W0, P6W0},
{P2W0, P7W0}}
vˆ = P0W0
PD(G) = 4
WD(G) = 6
|G | = 5
Figure 1: e system-wide propagation graph
of Tinba malware sample.
4.1 Data collection
e goal of our data collection is to establish a set of samples that
broadly represents the Windows malware landscape over several
years. To this end, we have collected samples from various kinds
of malware, a diverse set of families and from an extended timeline.
We identify the year a sample is from as the year the sample was
rst submied to VirusTotal. In contrast to other quantitative large-
scale studies [5, 33] that analyse tens and hundreds of thousands of
malware samples, we instead keep the total samples in our data set
comparatively low and comprehensible but with a wide distribution
of malware families. is is because samples within the same family
tend to behave similarly [28], and by keeping the numbers low, we
enable more investigations to understand and verify results at a
detailed and complete level.
Most of the samples in our data set are collected from kernelmode-
.info, VirusTotal, and a few are from virusshare.com, contagi-
odump.com and Malpedia [28]. To ensure that we had no benign
samples we required each sample to be detected by at least 13
anti-malware vendors and to ensure consistency of the samples
belonging to a given malware family we required for each sample
that at least two vendors label it within the same malware family.
Family Discovered Family Discovered
Androm 2012-2014 Midie 2013, 2016-2017
Artemis 2012 MiniDuke 2013, 2017
Barys 2012-2013, 2015 Mira 2014, 2016-2017
Bitman 2015-2016 Natas 2017-2018
Buzus 2013, 2016, 2018 Neshta 2012-2014
CTBLocker 2015-2016 Neshuta 2012-2014
Cerber 2015-2017 Ngrbot 2012, 2014-2018
CoinMiner 2013-2015, 2017 Nimnul 2013-2017
CosmicDuke 2013-2014 Nitol 2013, 2015
Crowti 2014-2016 Nymaim 2013, 2015-2018
Cryptlock 2013-2014, 2016 Otwycal 2017-2018
Cutwail 2014-2016, 2018 Padodor 2017-2018
DealPly 2013-2014 Parite 2013, 2015, 2017
Dorkbot 2012, 2013, 2015, 2018 Pony 2014, 2018
Dridex 2014-2016 Pronny 2018
Eldorado 2013-2014 Ramnit 2012, 2014-2017
Emotet 2012, 2014-2017 Razy 2013-2014
Fareit 2013, 2015-2017 Renos 2014, 2018
Flood 2013, 2015-2017 Rovnix 2014, 2016
Fujacks 2014-2015, 2018 Sality 2014, 2016-2017
Fynloski 2012-2013, 2015-2016, 2018 Shifu 2015, 2017
Gamarue 2012, 2017 Simda 2012, 2014-2015
Gootkit 2014-2015 Symmi 2012-2014
Kasidet 2015, 2018 TeslaCrypt 2015-2016
Kazy 2013-2014, 2017 TinyBanker 2012, 2017
Kovter 2013-2016 Urausy 2012
Kraddare 2012-2014 Ursnif 2015-2016, 2018
Kryptik 2012-2015, 2017 VBKrypt 2013-2014, 2016-2017
Madangel 2013, 2015, 2017 Vawtrak 2013, 2015-2016, 2018
Madi 2012 Wannacry 2017-2018
Mamba 2018 Waski 2013-2015, 2017
Mazam 2016 Zbot 2012-2014
Vilsel 2014, 2016-2017
Total families: 65
Total samples: 650
Table 1: e malware families that we used for our study.
We used 10 samples from each family.
On average each sample had 51 anti-malware vendors report it as
malicious and a median of 53.
Our data set contains 65 dierent malware families with ten
samples from each family, making a total of 650 samples. Table 1
shows the specic families and the years their samples were rst
discovered, and Figure 2 shows the yearly-distribution of when
samples were rst discovered. Our data set has samples spanning
2012-2018 and Figure 3 shows the number of families represented
each year. We have an average of 22 families represented each
year, with a maximum of 33 families in 2014 and a minimum of 19
families in 2012.
4.2 Research questions
e goal of our study is to characterise malware propagation at
large and to do this, we propose four high level research questions.
(1) Is system-wide malware propagation prevalent?
e goal of this research question is to give quantita-
tive measurements of the basic characteristics of malware
propagation at large. To answer this, we gather statistics
on the number of processes and execution waves in each
malware sample and also the depths and width of the SPG.
(2) Are the propagation strategies used in the wild diverse?
e goal of this research question is to give insights
about the individual propagation strategies used by the
malware samples. To answer this, we investigate (1) which
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Figure 2: Yearly-distribution of samples in our data set.
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
0
20
40
Year
Fa
m
ili
es
Figure 3: Yearly-distribution of families.
processes are the targets of malware propagation, (2) which
specic techniques are used for malware propagation and
(3) the proportion of droppers versus code injections.
(3) Are there clear relations between malicious behaviour and
system-wide malware propagation?
e goal of this research question is to identify how
malware performs its malicious behaviours, e.g. achieves
persistence, escalates process-level privileges or connects
back to its C&C server, relative to its system-wide propa-
gation strategy. To answer this question, we investigate
where in the SPG malware: (1) uses dynamically gener-
ated code, (2) executes most of its code and (3) performs
sensitive API calls.
(4) Has system-wide malware executions changed consistently
towards one direction and are there any clear inter-family
SPG consistency?
e goal of this research question is to measure if mal-
ware propagation has changed over time and if samples
from the same family propagate similarly. To answer this
question, we gather statistics based on grouping our data
set into the years the samples were rst observed and also
do family-oriented statistics.
4.3 Experimental set up
We conduct all of our experiments on a 4-core Intel-7 CPU with 4.2
GHz and a Windows 7, 32-bit guest architecture. e guest is in
a closed network and connected to another virtual machine that
performs network simulation using InetSim[19]. As such, malware
samples that connect back to some C&C server will be able to
resolve DNS names, connect to every IP and also receive content.
However, the content itself is the default data provided by INetSim,
which will hinder malware samples from geing C&C-specic data,
e.g. bot commands. We set a recording time of 25 seconds and a
lo of 120 minutes for replaying. Due to the resources required to
run this type of experiment, we analysed each sample once.
e applications on the guest machine were executed with a local
admin account and with User Account Control (UAC) enabled. We
perform no user stimulation during the analysis, and no applications
were running in the guest system apart from the generic Windows
processes. To start execution of a given sample, we mount it as an
.iso le in QEMU and then send keystrokes to QEMU to execute
command-line commands in the guest’s terminal for opening the
mounted .iso and starting the sample.
4.4 Generating multi-process signatures
e goal of our study is to give a precise view of system-wide propa-
gation and we need to ensure we distinguish malware samples that
use dierent multi-process propagation techniques, while simulta-
neously identifying samples that rely on the same technique. To
this end, we use the output of Minerva to highlight multi-process
propagation and then manually rene this information into easily
recognisable signatures. We use the precise API capture of Min-
erva, the system-wide malware execution trace and identication
of intrinsic aspects in multi-process transitions to speed up the
reverse engineering process signicantly. We started our study
with no signatures and then incrementally created signatures for
each analysed sample.
4.5 False positive and false negative
elimination
Minerva may over-taint the system and include benign code in the
malware execution trace. To elegantly solve this issue, we introduce
a heuristic that identies over-tainting in order to eliminate false
positives.
To identify over-tainting, we rst check for each sample with
multi-process execution if any of our generated signatures recog-
nise the multi-process transitions. If there are some processes with
malicious execution but no matching signature, then we consider
this process a potential case of over-tainting. We determine this by
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matching the tainted code with code that was present in the system
before the malware execution. e idea is that if the code execution
is due to over-tainting, it must be part of the non-malware code
and, therefore, part of the original code as it was before the mal-
ware execution. We verify this in practice by matching API calls
observed by Minerva and the API calls performed by the potentially
benign code. If we nd more than 99.00% of the API calls from the
tainted code correspond to API calls in the existing Windows code
or if the tainted code has no API calls in the process at all then
we declare the process a false-positive. Otherwise, we consider it
a true positive and reverse engineer the code in order to create a
signature. e reason we maintain a 99% threshold is to allow for
incompleteness in our ability to extract API calls statically from the
Windows code and Minerva does this as part of our static analysis
post dynamic analysis. So far we have not found any false positives
from this approach.
Finally, PANDA itself may fail in some instances and only replay
lile of the recorded execution. To deal with samples that did not
execute properly, we remove all samples with less than 25 dierent
instructions executed on the system.
All of the statistics we report in this paper are post false-positive
elimination, including the input data set described in 4.1. As such,
we have manually veried multi-process execution for all samples
in our data set as a result of our signature creation. e numbers
we report are, therefore, a strict lower-bound, but we may miss out
on some aspects of the malware capabilities due to the nature of
dynamic analysis. Although a strict lower-bound, we consider it a
precise estimate, and oen signicantly more accurate in compari-
son to other work, as justied by the work described in [24].
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our study in terms of
the four research questions described above. is section focuses
on a quantitative presentation and then in Section 6, we give an
interpretation and qualitative discussion of the results.
5.1 antitative measurements
We now present results related to our rst research question “Is
system-wide malware propagation prevalent?” by gathering statistics
about the core aributes of the SPGs in our entire data set.
e rst statistic we gather is the number of processes involved
in each malware execution, and Figure 5 shows the results. In total,
151 of the 650 samples exhibited multi-process propagation and
67 of these samples split into two processes. is means 23.23% of
all samples use multi-process propagation and 55.6% of malware
that performs multi-process propagation do so in three or more
processes. e 151 samples are from 40 dierent families corre-
sponding to 62% of all families, and Table 2 shows the complete list
of families and their respective number of multi-process samples.
Madangel is the only family where all samples use multi-process
propagation, and we observed four families where all but one sam-
ple deployed multi-process execution, namely Emotet, Razy, Natas
and TinyBanker. e maximum number of processes we observed
in a single malware execution is eleven, which occurred in three
samples from the Natas family and Figure 4 shows the SPG of one
sample.exe
318, 1 wave
sample.exe
2f 8, 1 wave
ulowu.exe
2f 0, 2 waves
cmd.exe
6cc , 1 wave
ulowu.exe
150, 1 waves
explorer.exe
43c , 1 wave
conhost.exe
76c , 1 wave
cmd.exe
73c , 1 wave
dwm.exe
458, 1 wave
conhost.exe
14c , 1 wave
taskhost.exe
50c , 1 wave
Figure 4: e system-wide propagation graph
of Natas sample. Only processes are shown,
and each process box contains the PID and
the number of waves for the given process.
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Figure 5: Number of processes involved in malware execu-
tions of all samples.
of these samples1. e malware initially transitions through three
processes via les that it dropped on the system and then at a
process-depth of four injects code into every process on the system
for which it has permissions.
e process-depths exhibited by the samples are shown in Table
3 and, in total, 91.7% of the samples have a process-depth of either
one or two. is is more samples than the number of samples with
1SHA-256 sum bd037ee28fc97f59525f384136fc067dded691230597384f04b10efe360055d1
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Family |M | Family |M | Family |M | Family |M |
Madangel 10 CoinMiner 5 Ursnif 3 Fynloski 2
Natas 9 Nitol 5 Dridex 3 Cerber 1
Emotet 9 Midie 4 CTBLocker 3 Barys 1
TinyBanker 9 Urausy 4 Kryptik 3 Bitman 1
Razy 9 Vawtrak 4 VBKrypt 2 Fareit 1
Gamarue 7 Dorkbot 3 Androm 2 Waski 1
Ramnit 7 Zbot 3 Buzus 2 TeslaCrypt 1
Mira 7 Kasidet 3 Cutwail 2 Eldorado 1
Sality 6 Kovter 3 Crowti 2 Shifu 1
Nimnul 6 Symmi 3 Nymaim 2 Ngrbot 1
Table 2: Families with multi-process propagation. |M| de-
notes the number ofmulti-process samples in the given fam-
ily.
Process-depth 1 2 3 4 5
Samples 499 97 23 14 17
Table 3: Process-depths of all samples.
one or two process executions (87%) conrming that some malware
split execution rather than incrementally build a chain of multi-
process executions. We found a maximum process-depth of ve,
and this occurred in seventeen samples. e complete list of process-
depths for all 40 families with multi-process propagation is shown
in Table 4. We nd that 17 families have multiple samples with
multi-process execution that do not exhibit the same process-depth,
and, on the other hand, we nd that in 12 families with multiple
multi-process samples all samples with multi-process execution
within their respective family exhibit the same process-depth.
e SPG-widths of all the samples are shown in Table 5. In total,
597 of the samples have an SPG-width of one, which means the vast
majority of samples sequentially propagate through processes. e
maximum SPG-width we found was seven, and this occurred in ve
malware samples, three of which belong to the Natas family, one
from the Shifu family and one from the Ramnit family. We found
a total of 20 families with at least one sample that has SPG-width
larger than one, and the full list of these families are shown in Table
6 alongside the number of samples in each family that deploys a
given SPG-width.
e distribution of execution waves is shown in Table 7. In
total, 393 of 650 samples have multiple execution waves, which
correspond to 60% of the samples, and we found thirteen samples
that deploy more than 25 execution waves. e three highest counts
of execution waves are 54, 354 and 5389, which came from samples
in the Pronny, Artemis and Urausy malware families, respectively.
In gure 16 we show the average number and standard deviation of
execution waves per family in all families except Pronny, Artemis
and Urausy, who have an average of 43, 37 and 545 execution waves,
respectively, and, a standard deviation of 2, 52 and 807. We observe
seven families that have no execution waves, meaning they do not
deploy any dynamically generated code, and the average number
of execution waves is slightly less than 15 if we discard the three
families mentioned above. Additionally, the standard deviation
is reasonably consistent across the majority of families, however,
certain families show a considerable variation and the following
families: Urausy, Artemis, Shifu, Buzus, Mira, Androm, Ursnif,
Process-depth 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Androm 8 1 1 Midie 6 3 1
Barys 9 1 Mira 3 7
Bitman 9 1 Natas 1 4 5
Buzus 8 1 1 Ngrbot 9 1
CTBLocker 7 3 Nimnul 4 3 1 2
Cerber 9 1 Nitol 5 5
CoinMiner 5 5 Nymaim 8 2
Crowti 8 1 1 Ramnit 3 3 2 1 1
Cutwail 8 2 Razy 1 9
Dorkbot 7 1 2 Sality 4 6
Dridex 7 2 1 Shifu 9 1
Eldorado 9 1 Symmi 7 1 1 1
Emotet 1 1 1 5 2 TeslaCrypt 9 1
Fareit 9 1 TinyBanker 1 7 1 1
Fynloski 8 2 Urausy 6 1 3
Gamarue 3 7 Ursnif 7 1 2
Kasidet 7 3 VBKrypt 8 2
Kovter 7 1 1 1 Vawtrak 6 2 2
Kryptik 7 3 Waski 9 1
Madangel 10 Zbot 7 1 1 1
Table 4: Families with at least one sample that has process-
depth higher than one. e columns indicate a given
process-depth and the rows display the number of samples
in a given family with the given depth.
SPG-width 1 2 4 4 5 6 7
Samples 597 24 4 6 9 5 5
Table 5: SPG-width of all samples.
SPG-widths 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Androm 9 1
CTBLocker 7 3
Cerber 9 1
CoinMiner 9 1
Cutwail 8 2
Dorkbot 8 2
Emotet 3 4 2 1
Kovter 9 1
Madangel 8 2
Midie 9 1
Natas 5 2 3
Nitol 5 5
Nymaim 8 2
Ramnit 5 1 3 1
Razy 9 1
Sality 4 1 5
Shifu 9 1
TinyBanker 8 2
VBKrypt 8 2
Vawtrak 7 3
Table 6: Families with at least one sample that has SPG-
width higher than one. e columns indicate a given SPG-
width and the rows display the number of samples in a given
family that deploys the given SPG-width.
Execution waves 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Samples 257 123 97 41 17 31 7
Execution waves 8 9 10 11-15 16-25 >25
Samples 12 6 7 26 13 13
Table 7: e number of execution waves of all samples.
Symmi and VBkrypt each have a standard deviation that is larger
than their respective average number of execution waves.
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5.2 Propagation intrinsics
We now present results related to our second research question “Are
the propagation strategies used in the wild diverse?”. To do this, we
identify the processes that are targets of multi-process propagation,
identify the API routines used by malware to propagate through
the system, discuss detailed case studies of interesting malware
samples, and also measure the proportion of code injections versus
propagations via dropped les.
5.2.1 Target processes. Table 6 shows the names of the most
targeted processes and the number of times they were used for
multi-process propagation. e most popular target is malware
starting another instance of itself, in this case sample.exe. e
second most popular target is explorer.exe and following this
are iexplore.exe, cmd.exe and conhost.exe, which are all part
of the Windows OS. In fact, the following eight Windows ap-
plications explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, cmd.exe, conhost.exe,
taskhost.exe, dwm.exe svchost.exe, and winver.exe make up
241 targets out of 394 multi-process propagations, corresponding
to roughly 61%. Furthermore, if we discard the multi-process exe-
cutions via sample.exe these eight applications make up 75% of
the victims.
In total, we found 244 multi-process executions targeted pro-
cesses with names from the Windows OS, and 150 multi-process
executions with proprietary names where sample.exe takes up
74 of these. As such, there are only 76 cases where the malware
execute via programs with non-standard names, corresponding to
19% of the total multi-process propagations.
In Table 12, we show the per-family process targets as well as the
number of samples in each family that execute in the given target.
e table also shows the size of the group of samples that share most
target processes and the size of this group over the total samples
in the family. Finally, the table shows the number of samples in
the group just mentioned multiplied by the number of targets they
share over the total number of propagations in the given family.
We nd a total of twenty families where all samples in the given
family that deploys multi-process propagation also share the largest
intersection of target processes. In seventeen of these families this
intersection makes up the entire set of process targets from the
given family, and in the remaining three families, namely Sality,
TinyBanker and Madangel, some samples also propagate to more
targets. In the twenty families, however, only eleven have more
than one sample that does multi-process propagation, meaning that
in a total of six families with multi-process propagation all samples
that propagate into multiple processes share the exact same targets.
Sality is particularly interesting in that all six samples that do
multi-process propagation execute within the same ve processes,
whereas four of these samples also execute in rundll.exe and one
also executes in sample.tmp. Gamarue is another interesting case,
where all seven samples that do multi-process propagation inject
into the same process, namely wuauclt.exe.
5.2.2 Signature diversity. Malware use a variety of Windows
APIs to propagate through the system, and we now present these
by way of the process propagation signatures we created in our
analysis of all the multi-process propagations. e signatures we
have created are API-specic, e.g. we consider CreateFileW and
CreateFileA to be dierent API functions. e benet of this is to
have detailed statistics, from which we can indeed build abstrac-
tions, and the drawback is that some signatures can have minor
dierences to other signatures, e.g. whether the malware uses
Unicode or ASCII.
We found a total of 417 injections, which is more than the 394
processes that are results of multi-process execution. e reason for
this is that multiple processes may inject into the same target pro-
cess, as shown in the previously discussed Natas sample in Figure 4
where multiple processes inject into the same cmd.exe process. e
complete set of signatures we observed is shown in Table 13, which
is sorted by the number of times they occur. In total, we discovered
33 dierent signatures and the most common way for malware
to inject into other processes is using the traditional code injec-
tion technique with API calls to OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx,
WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread. is approach is used
in 174 of 417 cases, corresponding to 41.7%. In contrast, we found
six signatures that are only used once, and they rely mainly on a
subset of the APIs from other signatures.
In general, when malware propagate through the system, it
can do so by either launching a new process or migrating to an
existing one. To estimate the proportion of these two we count
the number of signatures that use OpenProcess, CreateProcess
and ShellExecute to access the victim process, which is 211, 213
and 15, respectively. As such, there is a an almost even distribution
between cases that open an existing process (OpenProcess) and
launching a new process (CreateProcess and ShellExecute).
In Table 8, we show the per-family signature usage, the num-
ber of injections that rely on a given signature and the number of
samples that use the given signature. We nd 17 families that rely
on a single signature and 23 families that deploy more than one
signature. Sality is an interesting family in that it has a total of
41 process-propagations amongst six samples that all rely on the
same signature to propagate. We observe similar trends in Dorkbot,
Emotet, Natas, Ramnit, TinyBanker, VBKrypt and Vawtrak where
samples extensively reuse the same signatures. We observe an op-
posite trend in families like Buzus, Dridex, Kovter, Kryptik, Fynloski
and Ursnif that each has multiple samples performing multi-process
propagation without any overlap in propagation technique. Buzus
is particularly interesting in this context, where we observe two
samples that combined use seven dierent injection techniques, and
each of the signatures is only used once. In the following section,
we will go into details with interesting injection techniques, and
then in Section 5.4.2, we will present further quantitative analysis
of inter-family consistency in terms of propagation signatures.
5.2.3 Interesting case studies. Injection via continuously rewrit-
ing window procedure. We observed two injections, IDs #24 and
#29, that use dynamically generated code to hide the API calls
involved in their respective injection. Specically, three malware
samples from the Urausy and Buzus families repeatedly overwrite
a particular memory region with code that performs a single API
call in order to create a chain-like structure that results in a com-
plete injection procedure. e memory region is disguised as a
Window procedure and called via the CallWindowProcA function.
e eect of this is that the code responsible for the injection is
constantly overwrien, remains in memory for a short time, and is
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Figure 6: e processes that are the most popular targets for multi-process propagation.
never entirely represented in memory but only exposed in multiple
temporal pieces. Minerva explicitly observes this by detecting a
new wave of dynamically generated code whenever the malware
calls CallWindowProcA. is makes it easy to detect that the mem-
ory is continuously updated because the execution waves have
instructions execute in the same memory region.
Stealthy injection via ZwCreateUserProcess hooking. An-
other interesting code injection is ID #13 which leverages three
common API calls CreateProcessA, VirtualAllocEx and WritePr-
ocessMemory, but does not have any call to functions like CreateRe-
moteThread or ResumeThread. In all cases where this signature
occur, the target program is C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
and has dwCreationFlags set to NULL, meaning the program is
not started in suspended mode. is is unusual because without
a call to ResumeThread or CreateRemoteThread it is, at rst sight,
unclear how the malware achieves code execution in the victim
process. Instead, the malware achieves code execution in the victim
process by patching the code of CreateProcessA at run time and
then hijacking the Windows code that is in charge of creating a new
process. It does this by hooking ZwCreateUserProcess to execute
malicious code that will allocate and write memory to the target
process, all nested inside the CreateProcessA call. To illustrate
this, Figure 7 shows the call graph of samples that rely on this
injection technique.
e hook is easy to detect given the output of Minerva from
looking at the malware execution trace, shown in Figure 8. From
CreateProcessA(victim process)
CreateProcessInternal
ZwCreateUserProcess
Hijack first instruction
of ZwCreateUserProcess
LOOP:
VirtualAlloc
VirtualProtect
WriteProcessMemory
...
Figure 7: Call graph of code injection that hooks
ZwCreateUserProcess. API calls made by the malware
are shown in bold.
the export extractor in Minerva we know ZwCreateUserProcess
is located at 0x77c46a98 and given the rst instruction is turned
into a trampoline to malware code, we can easily deduce that the
function is hooked. e benet of this code injection technique is
potential evasion against sandboxes and manual debuggers that
only monitor CreateProcessA calls and not nested function calls.
As such, if the hooking is not observed, then specic parts of the
injection will likely go unnoticed, and the threat may evade analysis.
Stealthy injection without explicit PID access. In most cases,
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Family |M | Σ (signature ID, injection count, sample count), …
Androm 2 3 (2, 2, 1) (17, 1, 1) (22, 1, 1)
Barys 1 1 (4, 2, 1)
Bitman 1 1 (2, 1, 1)
Buzus 2 7 (1, 1, 1) (3, 1, 1) (5, 1, 1) (10, 1, 1) (17, 1, 1) (28, 1, 1) (29, 1, 1)
CTBLocker 3 1 (2, 6, 3)
Cerber 1 2 (8, 1, 1) (11, 1, 1)
CoinMiner 5 5 (8, 2, 2) (11, 2, 1) (25, 1, 1) (26, 1, 1) (27, 1, 1)
Crowti 2 1 (4, 3, 2)
Cutwail 2 1 (2, 4, 2)
Dorkbot 3 3 (1, 12, 2) (2, 2, 2) (15, 1, 1)
Dridex 3 3 (1, 1, 1) (4, 2, 1) (33, 1, 1)
Eldorado 1 1 (7, 1, 1)
Emotet 9 6 (1, 18, 3) (2, 10, 6) (3, 2, 2) (4, 10, 5) (5, 2, 2) (10, 1, 1)
Fareit 1 1 (3, 1, 1)
Fynloski 2 2 (2, 1, 1) (10, 1, 1)
Gamarue 7 1 (9, 7, 7)
Kasidet 3 1 (19, 3, 3)
Kovter 3 3 (3, 1, 1) (9, 3, 1) (14, 3, 1)
Kryptik 3 3 (4, 1, 1) (10, 1, 1) (16, 1, 1)
Madangel 10 2 (1, 2, 2) (6, 10, 10)
Midie 4 2 (2, 2, 1) (6, 6, 3)
Mira 7 1 (12, 7, 7)
Natas 9 4 (1, 34, 5) (3, 14, 9) (10, 5, 5) (23, 3, 3)
Ngrbot 1 1 (1, 1, 1)
Nimnul 6 6 (7, 3, 3) (8, 2, 2) (11, 2, 2) (13, 2, 2) (17, 1, 1) (22, 1, 1)
Nitol 5 1 (2, 10, 5)
Nymaim 2 1 (2, 4, 2)
Ramnit 7 7 (1, 7, 1) (5, 2, 1) (7, 1, 1) (8, 6, 6) (11, 3, 3) (13, 5, 5) (18, 4, 4)
Razy 9 3 (2, 2, 1) (7, 7, 7) (16, 1, 1)
Sality 6 1 (1, 41, 6)
Shifu 1 1 (1, 8, 1)
Symmi 3 4 (2, 2, 2) (4, 2, 1) (17, 1, 1) (22, 1, 1)
TeslaCrypt 1 1 (2, 1, 1)
TinyBanker 9 3 (1, 19, 9) (3, 1, 1) (5, 9, 9)
Urausy 4 5 (14, 3, 3) (15, 2, 2) (20, 3, 3) (21, 3, 3) (24, 2, 2)
Ursnif 3 6 (1, 1, 1) (16, 2, 1) (27, 1, 1) (30, 1, 1) (31, 1, 1) (32, 1, 1)
VBKrypt 2 3 (1, 12, 2) (3, 2, 2) (5, 2, 2)
Vawtrak 4 3 (1, 16, 3) (4, 2, 1) (26, 1, 1)
Waski 1 1 (16, 1, 1)
Zbot 3 6 (1, 1, 1) (2, 1, 1) (15, 3, 2) (16, 1, 1) (17, 1, 1) (25, 1, 1)
Table 8: e per-family list of signatures. Σ denotes the
number of signatures used by a given family and |M| de-
notes the number of samples in a given family that deploys
multi-process execution. e rightmost column shows the
specic signatures used in each family, the number of injec-
tions that uses a given signature and the number of samples
in the given family that uses this signature.
the signatures rely on CreateProcess(A/W) or OpenProcess to ini-
tiate multi-process propagation. ese functions make it is easy for
an analyst or sandbox to determine the target process as the output
of the functions contains the PID of the process they create/open.
Naturally, some injection techniques avoid these functions to hide
the multi-process target, and an example of this is signature #20.
Injection #20 retrieves a handle to the target process by calling
GetShellWindows, opens the process using ZwOpenProcess and
then continues with a familiar paern of functions to initiate exe-
cution. In this way, the PID of the target process is never exposed
in any of the functions used in the injection, which adds a level
of complexity to identifying the specic propagation procedure.
Naturally, Minerva follows the malware execution regardless of
knowing the target process PID.
5.2.4 Code injections vs droppers. An interesting distinction is
whether a multi-process propagation is due to code injection or a
dropped executable. Although these two approaches are not mutu-
ally exclusive (because a sample can drop a le, launch it and then
inject code into it) it is interesting to estimate how prevalent each of
them is. To give such an estimate we check for each multi-process
Address instruction
0x405996 jmp CreateProcessA(...)
0x77c46a98 jmp 0x403447 Hook in ZwCreateUserProcess
0x403447 push ebp Hooked code
… … Hooked code
0x4013c0 lea edi, [ebp-0x54] Return from CreateProcessA
Figure 8: e malware execution trace of a code injection
that hooks the function ZwCreateUserProcess.
Family |M | |MD | Family |M | |MD |
Cerber 1 1 Ramnit 7 6
CoinMiner 5 5 Razy 9 8
Dridex 3 1 Sality 6 1
Eldorado 1 1 Urausy 4 2
Kryptik 3 1 Ursnif 3 2
Natas 9 5 Waski 1 1
Nimnul 6 5 Zbot 3 1
Table 9: e families with samples that propagate via
dropped les. e table also shows the number of sam-
ples with multi-process propagation, denoted |M|, and the
unique number of samples in each family that deploys prop-
agation via dropped les, denoted |MD |.
propagation if the target process corresponds to a le created by
the malware earlier in the execution, and if so consider it to be
an execution of a dropped executable. We found 52 multi-process
executions where the propagation was in a created le and 342
cases where it was not the case. As such, we estimate that 13% of
the multi-process executions in our data set are due to droppers,
and the remaining 87% are due to code injections. We found a total
of 14 malware families that had samples propagate via created les
and Table 9 lists these together with the number of samples in each
family that propagate in this way.
5.3 Malware activities
We now move on to the third research question “Are there clear
relations between malicious behaviour and system-wide malware
propagation?”. is research question aims to answer how malware
distributes its activities across its propagation and in this section
we, therefore, focus our statistics on the 151 samples that contain
multi-process execution and leave the other samples out. We limit
ourselves to these because our interest is in highlighting the dif-
ference between the initial process and the non-initial processes.
e initial process refers to execution at process-depth one, and the
non-initial processes refer to execution in processes with a depth
greater than one.
5.3.1 Execution wave distribution. e rst aspect we analyse is
where in the propagation malware deploys dynamically generated
code. Specically, we are interested in knowing if malware con-
tinues to use dynamically generated code even aer multi-process
execution. To do this, we count the number of waves in the initial
process and compare it to the number of waves in non-initial pro-
cesses. Amongst the 151 samples with multi-process execution, we
have a total of 545 processes with malware execution, meaning 394
of these are non-initial processes. e distribution of waves in the
initial process is shown in Table 9, and the distribution of waves
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in non-initial processes is shown in Table 10. We notice a clear
dierence in their distributions. In non-initial processes, 220 out
of 394 processes only have one execution wave and do, therefore,
not produce any dynamically generated code. In contrast, only 41
samples of 151 in the initial processes have one execution wave,
which corresponds to a drop from 56% in non-initial processes to
27% in initial processes. e average number of waves in the initial
process is 3.39, where the average number of waves in non-initial
processes is 1.64.
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Figure 9: e number of execution waves in the initial pro-
cess of all multi-process malware.
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Figure 10: enumber of executionwaves in non-initial pro-
cesses of all multi-process malware.
5.3.2 Code-size distribution. e second aspect we consider is
how much code the malware executes in each process, and then
map this into the entire context of the SPG. To measure this, we
collect the number of unique instructions executed in each process
and then compare the initial and non-initial processes. e reason
we base our measurement on unique instructions and not the total
number of executed instructions is to avoid bias because of decryp-
tion loops that oen have a signicantly larger amount of executed
instructions in comparison to non-decryption loops.
Figure 11 shows the number of instructions executed in the initial
and non-initial processes. e initial processes are signicantly
more dominant in terms of code size than non-initial processes with
an average number of 6157 unique instructions in initial processes
over 2500 in non-initial processes.
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Figure 11: e number of instructions executed in initial
processes and non-initial processes of all multi-process mal-
ware.
5.3.3 Sensitive API usage. Finally, we look at the distribution
of suspicious API calls in samples with multi-process execution.
To do this, we generate statistics about where in the SPG malware
uses API functions from four groups of sensitive Windows APIs
focusing on (1) registry access; (2) internet access; (3) le-system
access; and (4) security via process-privilege access. We count the
unique number of functions used by the malware from these groups
for each process in the SPG and Figure 12 shows the results for
initial and non-initial processes.
In general, non-initial processes have signicantly more usage
of APIs related to Internet and security, are on-par with registry-
related APIs, but uses less APIs related to the le system. We found
89 non-initial processes call ConvertStringSecurityDescriptor-
ToSecurityDescriptor, which is the most common call from this
group, and only six initial processes call this function. We also ob-
serve 60 non-initial processes that use InitializeSecurityDescri-
ptor, 60 processes that use SetSecurityDescriptorDacl and 58
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processes that use GetSecurityDescriptorSacl. All of these func-
tions provide features to change security descriptors of a given pro-
cess, which is used for process-level privilege elevation. As such,
malware is far more likely to initiate privilege escalation techniques
in non-initial processes than in the initial process.
In parallel to security sensitive APIs, we see eight times more
usage of Internet-related APIs in non-initial processes than in initial
processes. In non-initial processes, we saw a total of 59 processes us-
ing the WSAStartup function, which initialises the Windows socket
library (WS2 32.dll) and is the highest level of abstraction for work-
ing with Windows sockets. e next most popular Internet-related
functions are InternetOpen (27 processes), HttpOpenRequest (22
processes) and InternetConnect (22 processes). In contrast, in
initial processes, we only saw 11 use WSAStartup and zero usage
of the other functions.
In Table 10, we show the number of samples in each family
that uses functions from the four sensitive API-groups. e trends
from viewing all the samples as a whole follow, and we clearly
observe that families most oen use Internet and security APIs in
non-initial processes. In total, 29 families use Internet-related APIs
in non-initial processes whereas only 6 families use them in initial
processes, and 18 families use security-related APIs in non-initial
processes whereas only seven families use them in initial processes.
Roughly half of all samples with multi-process propagation use
Internet-related APIs in their non-initial process and a lile less
than a third uses security-related APIs. is is far more than the
usage in initial processes, which is about 7% for both API groups.
We observe slightly more usage of registry-related APIs in non-
initial processes and the usage of le system APIs is practically the
same between initial and non-initial processes.
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Figure 12: Sensitive API usage across initial and non-initial
processes.
Internet Registry File system Security
Family |M | Init Non-init Init Non-init Init Non-init Init Non-init
Androm 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Barys 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bitman 1 1 1
Buzus 2 2 1 2 2 2
CTBLocker 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cerber 1 1 1 1 1 1
CoinMiner 5 2 4 5 5 1
Crowti 2 1 1 2 2
Cutwail 2 2 2 2
Dorkbot 3 2 2 3 2
Dridex 3 2 2 1 3 2 1
Eldorado 1 1 1
Emotet 9 8 5 3 7 9 6
Fareit 1 1 1 1 1
Fynloski 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
Gamarue 7 7 7 7 7 1 7
Kasidet 3 3 3 3 3
Kovter 3 1 1 2 2 3
Kryptik 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 1
Madangel 10 2 1 1
Midie 4 1 1 2 4 2 1
Mira 7 1 1 7 7 7
Natas 9 5 5 9 9 9
Ngrbot 1 1 1 1
Nimnul 6 1 3 2 3 6 6 1
Nitol 5 3 5 1 5 3 1
Nymaim 2 1 2 1 2 1
Ramnit 7 1 5 5 7 7 7 1
Razy 9 1 1 1 9 9 1
Sality 6 6 6 1 6 6
Shifu 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Symmi 3 2 1 2 3 3 1
TeslaCrypt 1 1 1 1
TinyBanker 9 9 1 9 8 9
Urausy 4 4 1 4 4 4
Ursnif 3 2 2 3 3 2 3
VBKrypt 2 2 2 2
Vawtrak 4 1 4 3 4 4 3 4
Waski 1 1 1 1 1
Zbot 3 2 1 3 3 3 2
Total 151 11 73 63 87 136 133 10 46
Table 10: e amount of samples per family that use sensi-
tive functions exposed by the Windows API. e table lists
all four categories of sensitive API groups and the amount
samples that use these in initial and non-initial processes,
respectively.
5.4 Propagation evolution and inter-family
characteristics
We now move on to the fourth and nal research question “Has
system-wide malware executions changed consistently towards one
direction and are there any clear inter-family SPG consistency”. To
answer this question, we rst gather statistics about the yearly
average of processes involved in malware execution and identify
when specic propagation techniques were rst used. Following
this, we gather statics about inter-family consistency regarding
multi-process execution and propagation techniques.
5.4.1 Propagation evolution. e yearly average and the stan-
dard deviation of processes involved in each malware execution are
shown in Figure 13. e average number of processes uctuates,
and there is no clear sign towards a steady increase nor decrease.
ere is roughly an even distribution between the number of pro-
cesses over the years, and the overall average is 1.61.
Next, we investigate how the multi-process propagation tech-
niques have evolved by correlating the specic signatures we de-
veloped to recognise multi-process propagation in Section 5.2.2 to
when they were rst used. e number of unique signatures found
each year and the number of families in our data set for each year
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Figure 13: Yearly average number of processes and standard
deviation of all the samples.
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Figure 14: Number of dierent propagation signatures each
year and the number of families each year.
are shown in Figure 14. In general, we observe a steady usage of
signatures ranging from seven at the lowest (2018) to fourteen at the
highest (2017). In Figure 15, we show the number of signatures that
were discovered a given year, and, interestingly, we observe that
the number of novel propagation techniques is steadily decreasing.
is decrease shows clearly in that 25 out of 33 injection signatures
were rst used in 2012, 2013 and 2014, which amounts to 75% of all
injections being invented before 2015.
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Figure 15: e years signatures were rst used.
5.4.2 Inter-family propagation characteristics. roughout this
paper, we have explored various family-related aspects of system-
wide malware execution, and we now continue in this domain by
giving a more general assessment of inter-family consistency using
several relevant metrics. We continue with our denitions from
earlier and denote the number of samples in each family as |S| and
the number of samples that perform multi-process propagation as
|M|.
e rst consistency measurement we determine is whether fam-
ilies are stable in terms of multi-process propagation. To do this,
we compute the maximum number of samples in each family that
either perform multi-process propagation or stays in the same pro-
cess over the total amount of samples, given as max ( |M |, |S |−|M |)|S | .
is is shown in the fourth column from the le in Table 11, and
we nd an overall consistency average of 0.86. We do the same
check but restricted to the data set of families with samples that do
multi-process propagation, i.e. |M ||S | for families with |M| , 0, and
the result is shown in the h le-most column in Table 11. e
overall average decreases by 0.48 to 0.38. is is unexpected since
it shows there is lile consistency in the number of samples that
perform system-wide propagation within malware families where
at least one sample performs multi-process propagation.
Next, we consider the number of unique signatures deployed in
each malware family, which we denote Σ. We observe an average of
2.7 dierent signatures in malware families that have multi-process
propagating samples, as shown in the sixth column from the le
in Table 11. Another interesting measurement is the consistency
only between the malware samples that perform multi-process
propagation. To quantify this, we count the number of samples in
each family that has the same set of propagation signatures, and
we call this Σeq . For families with multi-process propagation, the
average number of samples with the same set of signatures is 2.62.
To measure the inter-family consistency we then divide Σeq with
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the number of propagating samples from each family, given as Σeq|M |
and this is shown in the second column from the right. Here, we
see an overall average of 0.73, meaning 73% of samples in families
with propagating samples have the same set of signatures.
Finally, we look at consistency based on the maximum number of
samples with similar signatures and the number of samples without
multi-process propagation, given as Seq = max(Σeq , |S| − |M|).
From Seq we then calculate Seq|S | to get a consistency measurement
on the entire family based on samples with the same set of signa-
tures or no signatures at all. On average, we see a 0.83 consistency
as shown in the rightmost column of Table 11. is shows that
83% of samples in each family either has the same set of signatures
for multi-process propagation, or no samples in the family have
multi-process propagation at all. We found no families that have
multi-process propagation to have a perfect score in this context.
6 DISCUSSION
We now give answers to our research questions, discuss the results
in more depth and also discuss the limitations of our study. We
present our discussion in chronological order of the research ques-
tions.
6.1 Answers to research questions
Research question 1. Is system-wide malware propagation preva-
lent? Yes!
We nd that 23.23% of samples perform multi-process propagation,
showing that almost a quarter of malware samples rely on host-
based propagation. In contrast, PaloAlto reports that 13.5% [26] of
malware samples in 2013 contain code injections and Ugarte et al.
[33] report that 15.6% samples (1,213 of 7,729) contain multi-process
execution in a data set spanning mid-2007 to mid-2014. We believe
the main reason for this is that our system is more general and
captures multi-process execution that previous work miss. Another
possibility for dierent results is data set dierence, in that Ugarte
et al. rely on samples that are older than ours.
System-wide malware propagation is not only prevalent in terms
of multi-process propagation but also the number of dynamically
generated execution waves. We nd that 60% of all samples have
multiple execution waves, meaning they deploy some form of dy-
namically generated code. In contrast, Ugarte et al. [33] found 78.7%
(6088 out of 7729 samples), Codisasm [9] reports 68% and Kang et al.
[21] report 98% (367 out of 374). Interestingly, we report the lowest
number since our model is generic in terms of system-wide mal-
ware execution. However, our model also distinguishes malicious
and benign code execution more precisely, and we suspect this to be
the main reason. Previous work unreasonably over-approximates
some aspects of the execution, e.g. capture dynamically generated
code by any code in a process with malware code executing and
these over-approximations may capture non-malicious execution
waves where we are highly resistant to this.
System-wide malware propagation has also been prevalent for
many years, showing that indeed this is not a new issue. We ob-
serve a steady use of multi-process propagation throughout our
entire data set, spanning 2012-2018, and we nd that 40 out of a
total 65 families use multi-process propagation, which is roughly
two-thirds of the families in our data set. As such, system-wide
propagation is prevalent not only in the number of total samples
but also in the majority of families.
Research question 2. Are the propagation strategies used in the
wild diverse? Yes!
We nd that there is a range of 2 to 11 processes in which malware
with system-wide propagation execute. As such, there is a signi-
cant dierence directly in the number of processes, although 85%
of samples with multi-process execution execute in either two or
three processes. In addition to this, there is also a broad range of
execution waves deployed by malware samples, with the majority
ranging between two and 25 execution waves. We nd only 13
samples with more than 25 execution waves. Previous work also
reports a diversity in the number of process executions and the
number of execution waves [9, 12, 21, 33].
Furthermore, we also observe diversity in process-depth, wave-
depth and SPG-width. We see a maximum process-depth of ve
processes and a maximum SPG-width of seven processes. is
means we see several malware samples that both spread out across
several processes and also perform their system-wide propagation
in a chain-like fashion.
One of the areas that show signicant diversity in propagation
strategy is the specic techniques malware use to propagate across
processes. We nd a total of 33 dierent propagation techniques,
and most of these have less than ten samples using the given tech-
nique. However, many of the more rarely-seen techniques are
derivatives of popular techniques. ese are derivatives in various
ways such as using hooking to rely on only a subset of the stan-
dard APIs. In addition to this, there is also an even distribution
between propagations that inject code into existing processes and
propagations that create new processes.
Interestingly, we also nd that malware with samples that do
system-wide propagation use on average 2.6 dierent propagation
techniques. is also means there is diversity within the SPG of
each malware sample, in the specic way they propagate through
the system.
We also observe that initial processes execute more code than
non-initial processes. On average, the initial processes execute
about three times more unique instructions than non-initial pro-
cesses. Furthermore, the set of processes that malware target to
perform multi-process propagation is mainly divided between a
small number of standard Windows applications.
Research question 3. Are there clear relations betweenmalicious
behaviour and system-wide malware propagation? Yes!
Two key observations provide arguments for the answer to our
third research question. First, the number of execution waves in the
initial process signicantly outnumbers the number of execution
waves in non-initial processes. In total, 73% of samples that deploy
multi-process propagation use dynamically generated code in their
initial process where the gure is 44% for processes that are a result
of multi-process propagation. As such, dynamically generated code
is a technique that is mostly used in the initial process but occurs
in almost half of the non-initial processes.
Second, the use of sensitive API calls is a central feature that
distinguishes code in the initial process and code in non-initial
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Family |S | |M | max (|M|, |S|−|M|)|S|
|M|
|S| Σ Σeq Seq
Σeq
|M|
Seq
|S|
Androm 10 2 8.00 0.20 3 1 8 0.50 0.80
Artemis 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Barys 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Bitman 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Buzus 10 2 8.00 0.20 7 1 8 0.50 0.80
CTBLocker 10 3 7.00 0.30 1 3 7 1.00 0.70
Cerber 10 1 9.00 0.10 2 1 9 1.00 0.90
CoinMiner 10 5 5.00 0.50 5 2 5 0.40 0.50
CosmicDuke 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Crowti 10 2 8.00 0.20 1 2 8 1.00 0.80
Cryptlock 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Cutwail 10 2 8.00 0.20 1 2 8 1.00 0.80
DealPly 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Dorkbot 10 3 7.00 0.30 3 1 7 0.33 0.70
Dridex 10 3 7.00 0.30 3 1 7 0.33 0.70
Eldorado 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Emotet 10 9 9.00 0.90 6 5 5 0.56 0.50
Fareit 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Flood 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Fujacks 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Fynloski 10 2 8.00 0.20 2 1 8 0.50 0.80
Gamarue 10 7 7.00 0.70 1 7 7 1.00 0.70
Gootkit 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Kasidet 10 3 7.00 0.30 1 3 7 1.00 0.70
Kazy 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Kovter 10 3 7.00 0.30 3 1 7 0.33 0.70
Kraddare 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Kryptik 10 3 7.00 0.30 3 1 7 0.33 0.70
Madangel 10 10 10.00 1.00 2 8 8 0.80 0.80
Madi 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Mamba 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Mazam 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Midie 10 4 6.00 0.40 2 3 6 0.75 0.60
MiniDuke 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Mira 10 7 7.00 0.70 1 7 7 1.00 0.70
Natas 10 9 9.00 0.90 4 4 4 0.44 0.40
Neshta 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Neshuta 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Ngrbot 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Nimnul 10 6 6.00 0.60 6 3 4 0.50 0.40
Nitol 10 5 5.00 0.50 1 5 5 1.00 0.50
Nymaim 10 2 8.00 0.20 1 2 8 1.00 0.80
Otwycal 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Padodor 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Parite 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Pony 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Pronny 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Ramnit 10 7 7.00 0.70 7 3 3 0.43 0.30
Razy 10 9 9.00 0.90 3 7 7 0.78 0.70
Renos 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Rovnix 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Sality 10 6 6.00 0.60 1 6 6 1.00 0.60
Shifu 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Simda 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Symmi 10 3 7.00 0.30 4 1 7 0.33 0.70
TeslaCrypt 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
TinyBanker 10 9 9.00 0.90 3 8 8 0.89 0.80
Urausy 10 4 6.00 0.40 5 2 6 0.50 0.60
Ursnif 10 3 7.00 0.30 6 1 7 0.33 0.70
VBKrypt 10 2 8.00 0.20 3 2 8 1.00 0.80
Vawtrak 10 4 6.00 0.40 3 2 6 0.50 0.60
Wannacry 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Waski 10 1 9.00 0.10 1 1 9 1.00 0.90
Zbot 10 3 7.00 0.30 6 1 7 0.33 0.70
vilsel 10 0 10.00 — — — 10 — 1.00
Total average 10.00 2.32 0.86 0.38 2.70 2.62 8.26 0.73 0.83
Table 11: Inter-family malware propagation characteristics.
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processes. We nd far more usage of security-related APIs and
Internet-related APIs in non-initial processes. is makes sense
because malware uses propagation techniques, including dynam-
ically generated code and multi-process propagation, to hide the
malicious code and make the analysis of it more complicated. In
addition to this, it makes sense that sensitive API calls are mainly
called in non-initial processes because a large number of targets are
benign Windows programs where sensitive API calls are considered
less suspicious.
Research question 4. Has system-wide malware executions
changed consistently towards one direction and are there any clear
inter-family SPG consistency? We nd no evidence of consistent
changes over the years, and for families, we nd areas of both inter-
family consistency and diversity!
We nd no clear evidence that the use of system-wide propagation
in malware is increasing nor decreasing but rather observe a uctu-
ating trend. Specically, there is no increase in either the number
of processes used by malware or execution waves and there is no
increase in the number of novel API paerns used to propagate
to multiple processes. We nd that there is a constant diversity
amongst signatures used every year, but that the number of unique
signatures invented is steadily decreasing.
From a high-level perspective, we nd several metrics that show
inter-family consistency. We nd that 86% of samples in each family
either propagate or do not propagate and, closely related, we nd
that 83% of samples in each family follow one direction of either
not deploying any system-wide propagation or implementing the
same set of propagation approaches. Additionally, In 17 out of 40
families with multi-process execution, we nd that the targets of
the multi-process samples of each family are the same, albeit it is
only six of these families that have multiple multi-process samples.
In terms of propagation strategy, we nd that for families with
multi-process execution an average of 73% of the samples use the
same APIs to propagate through the system, and we nd several
families where the samples in the respective family propagate using
a single signature. Furthermore, we nd that in 27 out of 31 families
that use Internet-related APIs the samples of each family purely use
functions from the API via initial or non-initial processes, meaning
the samples in each family consistently use Internet-related APIs in
the same way. We nd a somewhat similar trend with APIs related
to process-level privileges where samples from 12 families, out of a
total 17, exclusively use the API from either initial or non-initial
processes, albeit, 8 of these only have a single sample using the
security-related APIs.
However, we also observe several metrics that show signs of
inter-family diversity. For example, in the 40 families that have sam-
ples with multi-process execution, we nd an inter-family average
of 38% samples exhibiting multi-process execution. Furthermore, it
is only in one family where all samples deploy multi-process prop-
agation and only in 10 families that more than half of the samples
deploy multi-process execution. Additionally, we nd a signicant
variation in 9 out of all 65 families in terms of the number of exe-
cution waves deployed by the samples of the respective families,
in that the standard deviation is larger than the average number
of execution waves. Similarly, we nd that 17 out of 40 families
with multi-process execution have varying levels of process-depths,
meaning the samples in each family deploy diverse propagation
strategies.
6.2 Limitations
e main limitation of our study is that we execute the samples
under one specic seing. To get broader insights about malware
propagation we can leverage the use of dierential studies, by
analysing the malware under dierent contexts, similar to Cozzi et
al. [10]. For example, we set the recording time to 25 seconds, and
we did not perform any user stimulation. Increasing the recording
time is likely to produce interesting results, and supplying user
stimulation can trigger more behaviours in some types of mal-
ware. Another promising avenue is changing parameters in the
execution environment, such as the state of the guest machine. For
example, we used a vanilla Windows 7 with no processes running
except for the standard Windows applications. However, some mal-
ware samples rely on injecting into specic processes, such as web
browsers, and the state of our guest machine does not enable this
behaviour. By providing a more realistic setup, we may gather more
resourceful results. In addition to this, we could also collect more
comprehensive statistics by extending Minerva to support 64-bit
architectures, as some malware samples are observed to deploy
exotic propagation techniques only on this architecture [7].
7 RELATEDWORK
Large-scale dynamic analysis studies. ere are several exist-
ing studies based on large-scale dynamic analysis of malware. Bayer
et al. performed a study [5] on samples from early 2007 to late 2008
based on their Anubis malware analysis platform. eir data set is
based on submissions to their web portal, and they investigate vari-
ous aspects such as le system, network and registry activity as well
as botnet activity and sandbox detection. Ugarte et al. [33] presents
a large-scale study on packers based on an analysis platform build
on top of TEMU. However, their system is not as general as Min-
erva in terms of capturing system-wide malware execution [24]
and their works is largely focused on creating a packer taxonomy
and analysing their data set in relation to this taxonomy. Severi at
al. presents the Malrec malware analysis system [31], which is also
based on the PANDA instrumentation environment, and their study
incorporates 66,301 samples spread over 1,270 families as identied
by AVClass [30]. ey rst perform a study on how much malware
modify kernel code as a means of detecting privilege escalation and
then performed a study on malware classication.
Other large-scale malware analysis studies. Plohmann et
al. present the Malpedia platform [28], which is a collaborative
eort to gather samples and structure the malware landscape. ey
collect a corpus of 1800 malware samples spanning 600 families
and have manually unpacked many of them. Based on the data
set, they perform a study on various elements collected through
static analysis such as the PE headers, control-ow analysis and
API usage. Although the majority of large-scale studies focus on
Windows malware, there is some work about other operating sys-
tems and architectures. A recent study by Cozzi et al. [11] performs
a comprehensive investigation into Linux malware. e authors
collect a data set of 10,548 Linux malware samples for more than
15
eight dierent architectures and study several aspects like ELF
header manipulation, persistence, deception, privilege escalation
and process interactions. e growing number of Android and
mobile phones have also motivated several large-scale studies for
malware on the Android platform [15, 32, 34, 36].
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we performed a large-scale analysis of malware in the
wild, spanning 650 samples and 65 dierent families. Our study fo-
cused on the three aspects of system-wide malware propagation: (1)
prevalence and diversity; (2) relationship to malicious behaviours;
and (3) evolution and inter-family consistency.
We collected vast amounts of statistics to derive insights about
malware propagation and discussed our results in detail. We found
that system-wide propagation is prevalent and diverse amongst
malware samples. We found clear relationships between propaga-
tion and malware behaviours and found mixed signals in terms of
inter-family consistency. Surprisingly we did not see any increase
in malware propagation through the years but instead observed a
steady and consistent use.
e results of our study show that we can use a carefully selected
data set to derive a high-level view of malware propagation, albeit
this view can be blurry in places. We used this high-level view
to identify key characteristics of malware propagation that have
implications for existing work and also opens opportunities for new
research avenues.
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Family |M | (target process name, sample count), …, I |I ||M|
|I′ |
|T |
Androm 2 (sample.exe,2), (iexplore.exe,1), (uhUhRBmr.exe,1) 1 0.50 0.50
Barys 1 (explorer.exe,1), (svchost.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Bitman 1 (sample.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Buzus 2 (explorer.exe,2), (sample.exe,2), (iexplore.exe,2) 2 1.00 1.00
CTBLocker 3 (sample.exe,3), (iexplore.exe,3) 3 1.00 1.00
Cerber 1 (ns710D.tmp,1), (timetasks.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
CoinMiner 5 (sample.tmp,2), (ns9204.tmp,1), (CNminer.exe,1), (DbQZbGtq.exe,1),(WMIC.exe,1), (ns97DF.tmp,1) 1 0.20 0.43
Crowti 2 (explorer.exe,2), (svchost.exe,1) 1 0.50 0.67
Cutwail 2 (sample.exe,2), (iexplore.exe,2) 2 1.00 1.00
Dorkbot 3 (sample.exe,3), (taskhost.exe,2), (conhost.exe,2), (explorer.exe,2), (dwm.exe,2),(cmd.exe,2) 2 0.67 0.92
Dridex 3 (explorer.exe,2), (svchost.exe,1), (edg7AF9.exe,1) 1 0.33 0.50
Eldorado 1 (708D.tmp,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Emotet 9 (sample.exe,8), (explorer.exe,8), (svchost.exe,5), (iexplore.exe,4), (taskhost.exe,3),(conhost.exe,3), (dwm.exe,3), (cmd.exe,3), (winver.exe,2) 4 0.44 0.41
Fareit 1 (sample.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Fynloski 2 (notepad.exe,1), (sample.exe,1) 1 0.50 0.50
Gamarue 7 (wuauclt.exe,7) 7 1.00 1.00
Kasidet 3 (explorer.exe,3) 3 1.00 1.00
Kovter 3 (sample.exe,2), (svchost.exe,2) 2 0.67 0.50
Kryptik 3 (explorer.exe,1), (dllhost.exe,1), (73C8.tmp,1) 1 0.33 0.33
Madangel 10 (sample.exe,10), (explorer.exe,2) 10 1.00 0.83
Midie 4 (sample.exe,2), (sample.usr,2), (iexplore.exe,1) 2 0.50 0.40
Mira 7 (xvkwym.exe,3), (raphw.exe,2), (vlfsay.exe,2) 3 0.43 0.43
Natas 9 (sample.exe,9), (taskhost.exe,5), (conhost.exe,5), (explorer.exe,5), (cmd.exe,5),(dwm.exe,5), (ahos.exe,1), (uluwo.exe,1), (zaar.exe,1), (yros.exe,1), (loid.exe,1) 5 0.56 0.77
Ngrbot 1 (explorer.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Nimnul 6 (iexplore.exe,2), (DesktopLayer.e,2), (sampleSrv.exe,2), (tXoPUA.exe,1),(sample.exe,1), (OZpdVg.exe,1), (uhUhRBmr.exe,1), (fuDwxVB.exe,1) 2 0.33 0.55
Nitol 5 (sample.exe,5), (iexplore.exe,5) 5 1.00 1.00
Nymaim 2 (sample.exe,2), (iexplore.exe,2) 2 1.00 1.00
Ramnit 7
(iexplore.exe,6), (explorer.exe,5), (samplemgr.exe,3), (DesktopLayer.e,3),
(sampleSrv.exe,2), (conhost.exe,1), (OXYbHl.exe,1), (rundll32.exe,1),
(OXYbHlSrv.exe,1), (taskhost.exe,1), (dwm.exe,1), (cmd.exe,1)
3 0.43 0.35
Razy 9 (750F.tmp,1), (sample.exe,1), (79D0.tmp,1), (72FD.tmp,1), (iexplore.exe,1),(7686.tmp,1), (7425.tmp,1), (7722.tmp,1), (7119.tmp,1), (73E7.tmp,1) 1 0.11 0.20
Sality 6 (taskhost.exe,6), (conhost.exe,6), (explorer.exe,6), (dwm.exe,6), (cmd.exe,6),(rundll32.exe,4), (sample.tmp,1) 6 1.00 0.86
Shifu 1 (taskhost.exe,1), (conhost.exe,1), (explorer.exe,1), (dwm.exe,1), (cmd.exe,1),(dllhost.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Symmi 3 (sample.exe,3), (explorer.exe,1), (svchost.exe,1), (uhUhRBmr.exe,1) 1 0.33 0.50
TeslaCrypt 1 (sample.exe,1) 1 1.00 1.00
TinyBanker 9 (winver.exe,9), (explorer.exe,9), (taskhost.exe,2), (conhost.exe,2), (dwm.exe,2),(cmd.exe,2), (sample.exe,1) 9 1.00 0.67
Urausy 4 (sample.exe,4), (explorer.exe,3), (svchost.exe,3) 3 0.75 0.90
Ursnif 3 (explorer.exe,3), (cliciles.exe,1), (chtborui.exe,1), ( 7F9A.tmp,1), (factura.exe,1) 1 0.33 0.43
VBKrypt 2 (sample.exe,2), (taskhost.exe,2), (conhost.exe,2), (winver.exe,2), (explorer.exe,2),(dwm.exe,2), (cmd.exe,2) 2 1.00 1.00
Vawtrak 4 (explorer.exe,4), (taskhost.exe,3), (conhost.exe,3), (dwm.exe,3), (cmd.exe,3),(mainOUT-crypt,1), (svchost.exe,1) 3 0.75 0.83
Waski 1 (sample.tmp,1) 1 1.00 1.00
Zbot 3 (sample.exe,3), (explorer.exe,1), (kaylli.exe,1) 1 0.33 0.60
Table 12: Target processes of families with multi-process propagation. |M | denotes the number of samples in a given family that deploys
multi-process execution. I denotes the number of samples that have the largest intersection of targets amongst the samples in a given family,
|I′ | denotes the number of targets shared by the samples in I multiplied by the size of I and |T | denotes the total amount of multi-process
propagations in a given family.
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ID APIs #Total #Samples #Families
1 OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread 174 39 15
2 CreateProcessW, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext,
ResumeThread
48 28 14
3 CreateProcessW, VirtualAllocEx, ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ZwResumeThread 22 17 7
4
CreateProcessInternalW, ZwCreateSection, ZwMapViewOfSection,
ZwMapViewOfSection, ZwCreateThreadEx, ZwQueryInformationProcess,
ZwResumeThread
22 12 7
5 CreateProcessA, VirtualProtectEx, WriteProcessMemory, ResumeThread 16 15 5
6 WinExec 16 13 2
7 CreateFileA, WriteFile, WinExec 12 11 4
8 CreateFileA, WriteFile, CreateProcessA 11 9 4
9 ZwCreateSection, ZwMapViewOfSection, CreateProcessW,
ZwMapViewOfSection, ResumeThread 10 8 2
10 CreateProcessA, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory,
CreateRemoteThread
9 9 5
11 CopyFileA, CreateProcessA 8 5 4
12 fopen, write, fflush, CreateProcessA 7 7 1
13 CreateProcessA, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory 7 6 2
14 CreateProcessW, ZwCreateSection, ZwMapViewOfSection,
ZwMapViewOfSection, ZwResumeThread 6 4 2
15 CreateProcessA, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, GetThreadContext,
SetThreadContext, ResumeThread 6 5 3
16 CreateFileW, WriteFile, CreateProcessW 6 4 5
17 CreateProcessA, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, SetThreadContext,
ResumeThread
5 3 5
18 OpenProcess, ZwMapViewOfSection, ZwProtectVirtualMemory,
ZwWriteVirtualMemory, CreateRemoteThread 4 4 1
19 OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, VirtualProtectEx, WriteProcessMemory,
PostMessageW
3 3 1
20 GetShellWindow, ZwOpenProcess, ZwAllocateVirtualMemory,
ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ZwProtectVirtualMemory, CreateRemoteThread 3 3 1
21 CreateProcessW, ZwCreateSection, ZwMapViewOfSection, ZwCreateSection,
ZwMapViewOfSection
3 3 1
22 CopyFileW, ShellExecuteW 3 1 3
23 CreateFileW, WriteFile, CreateProcessW 3 3 1
24
CallWindowProcA, CreateProcessA, CallWindowProcA, VirtualAllocEx,
CallWindowProcA, WriteProcessMemory, CallWindowProcA,
GetThreadContext, CallWindowProcA, SetThreadContext, CallWindowProcA,
ResumeThread
2 2 1
25 CreateFileW, WriteFile, CreateProcessA 2 2 2
26 CreateFileA, WriteFile, ShellExecuteA 2 2 2
27 CreateFileW, WriteFile, ShellExecuteExW 2 2 2
28 OpenProcess, DuplicateHandle, ZwAllocateVirtualMemory,
WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread 1 1 1
29
CallWindowProcA, CreateProcessW, CallWindowProcA, VirtualAllocEx,
CallWindowProcA, WriteProcessMemory, CallWindowProcA,
SetThreadContext, CallWindowProcA, ResumeThread
1 1 1
30 OpenProcess, VirtualProtectEx, WriteProcessMemory, ResumeThread 1 1 1
31 OpenProcess, CreateRemoteThread, VirtualProtectEx,
ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ResumeThread 1 1 1
32 CreateFileW, WriteFile, CreateFileW, WriteFile, ShellExecuteW 1 1 1
33 CreateFileA, CreateFileMappingA, MapViewOfFile, UnmapViewOfFile,
CreateProcessA
1 1 1
Table 13: emulti-process signatures observed amongst all of the samples. For each signature, the table lists theAPIs involved
in the signature, the total number of times the signature was observed and the number of samples and families that uses it.
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Figure 16: Average number and standard deviation of execution waves per family. e plots are sorted by average starting
from the top le, i.e. notice the dierence in x-axis values between the two plots.
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